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The U.S. Supreme Court defined the elements for per se 
condemnation of tying arrangements in Jefferson Parish Hospital 
District No. 2 v. Hyde1 and reaffirmed the Jefferson Parish majority’s 
framework in its recent Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc. decision.2 Shortly after Jefferson Parish, however, the Seventh 
Circuit modified the Supreme Court’s test by adding an entirely 
separate element, the “economic interest requirement,” that plaintiffs 
must show for the court to condemn a tying arrangement as illegal per 
se.3 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit rethought this revision of 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. Business Administration, June 2004, Michigan State University. 
Paul C. Mallon, Jr. would like to thank his family for their continuing support, 
encouragement, and guidance.  
1 466 U.S. 2 (1984) 
2 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006) (concluding that tying arrangements involving patents 
“should be evaluated under the standards applied in . . . Jefferson Parish”). 
3 Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 
203 (7th Cir. 1985). 
1
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Supreme Court doctrine, and criticized the implementation of the 
economic interest requirement under the Jefferson Parish per se tying 
framework.4  
In June 2006, however, Judge Flaum’s majority opinion in Reifert 
v. South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp. reasserted the economic 
interest requirement as a prerequisite to finding a tying arrangement 
illegal per se.5 Concurring in Reifert’s outcome, Judge Wood 
explained that the majority was improperly anticipating the Supreme 
Court’s overruling of prior precedent.6 This Comment analyzes the 
propriety of the economic interest requirement in the Supreme Court’s 
per se tying analysis and concludes that the Jefferson Parish majority 
does not endorse its implementation as a requisite for a tying violation. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s per se tying analysis’s ability to 
achieve the goals of an antitrust per se standard is examined, resulting 
in a prediction that the per se analysis will be abandoned in the future. 
The per se analysis in tying arrangements is not as straightforward 
as the per se analysis in other areas of antitrust law.7 As a result, this 
Comment begins in Part I with an assay into the history of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of tying arrangements and the circuit 
courts’ implementation of the economic interest requirement into the 
per se tying analysis. It continues in Part II with an explanation of the 
majority and concurring analyses of tying arrangements in the Seventh 
Circuit’s recent Reifert decision. Part III examines in detail the 
arguments favoring and condemning the implementation of the 
economic interest requirement in a per se tying analysis and concludes 
that the requirement should not be used as a prerequisite for per se 
illegality of a tying arrangement under existing Supreme Court 
doctrine. Finally, Part IV analyzes the efficacy of the per se standard 
                                                 
4 Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
5 450 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2006) 
6 Id. at 323 (Wood, J. concurring). 
7 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) for an 
example of a classic per se analysis of a price fixing agreement. 
2
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as it applies to tying arrangements, and predicts that its time as the 
prevailing test for tying arrangements is limited. 
 
I. TYING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
 
Precluding contractual arrangements that have anticompetitive 
effects in the marketplace is an important objective of antitrust law.8 
One such contractual arrangement, long recognized by the Supreme 
Court to have anticompetitive effects on the marketplace, is the tying 
arrangement.9 A tying arrangement is an agreement to sell a product 
(the tying product) only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a 
different product (the tied product), or at least agree not to purchase 
that product from any other supplier.10 Early Supreme Court 
jurisprudence held that tying arrangements had few, if any, redeeming 
qualities.11 Due to this harsh perspective on tying arrangements, the 
Court began to treat them as illegal per se.12 The requirements for per 
                                                 
8 See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. §14 
(2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations.” Sherman Act § 1. Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act prohibits the sale or contract for sale of goods on the condition that the 
purchaser refuses to deal with a competitor where the effect of the condition is to 
lessen competition or create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Clayton Act § 3. 
9 See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United 
States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).  
10 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Carl Sandberg Vill. 
Condo. Ass’n v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1985); Buyer’s 
Corner Realty, Inc. v. N. Ky. Ass’n of Realtors, 410 F. Supp. 2d 574, 578 (E.D. Ky. 
2006). 
11 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6 (“[tying arrangements] deny competitors free 
access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying 
requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of his power or 
leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free 
choice between competing products.”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 
337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) (explaining that tying arrangements are almost always 
anticompetitive). 
12 Int’l Salt 332 U.S. at 396. 
3
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se illegality of tying arrangements have progressively changed since 
the Court started analyzing them,13 and the current test involves more 
of an economic inquiry than the classic antitrust per se analysis.14 The 
current per se analysis of tying arrangements has been criticized often 
in recent history,15 but the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to 
overrule it.16 
  
A. The Per Se Tying Analysis is Born 
 
Certain arrangements produce anticompetitive restraints so 
harmful to competition that the character of the restraint is a sufficient 
basis for presuming the arrangement is unreasonable under our 
antitrust laws.17 These arrangements are condemned as unreasonable 
per se without an intensive analysis of the arrangement’s actual market 
effects.18  
The per se treatment of tying under antitrust law can be traced 
back to the turn of the twentieth century in cases involving patent 
misuse.19 In Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co. the Supreme Court addressed a licensing 
agreement allowing use of a patented movie projection machine only 
for projecting certain films, which were neither part of the patented 
                                                 
13 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006); Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
14 See supra note 7. 
15 Ill. Tool Works Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1291; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 
(O’Connor, J. concurring); 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1730d (2d ed. 2004). 
16 Ill. Tool Works Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1291; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10. 
17 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10. 
18 Id. 
19See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502 (1917). The plaintiff in this case patented a part on a movie projection machine 
which feeds film through the machine. Id. The machines with the patented parts were 
sold on the condition that the machines “be used solely for exhibiting or projecting 
motion pictures” also owned by the plaintiff. Id. 
4
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machine, nor patented themselves.20 The Court found this arrangement 
was illegal because the patentee was extending its legal monopoly on 
movie projectors to the movie film market.21 This holding overturned 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,22 a decision made by the Court just five years 
prior, that a patentee may impose such conditions on a patent.23 The 
Court justified this change by citing the then-recently enacted Clayton 
Act § 3, which it saw as a possible congressional response to its 
decision in A.B. Dick.24  
The House Report corresponding to section 3 of the Clayton Act 
clearly explains the prevailing attitude toward tying arrangements at 
the time it was drafted.25 According to the Clayton Act House Report, 
tying arrangements are “one of the greatest agencies and 
instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man.”26 
The report continues in equally strong and dramatic language: “[the 
tying arrangement] completely shuts out competitors, not only from 
trade in which they are already engaged, but from the opportunities to 
build up trade in any community where these great and powerful 
combinations are operating under this system and practice.”27 This 
outright condemnation of tying arrangements by Congress 
                                                 
20 Id. at 508.  
21 Id. at 517. (explaining that “the owner intends to and does derive its profit, 
not from the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the 
unpatented supplies with which it is used, and which are wholly without the scope of 
the patent monopoly, thus in effect extending the power to the owner of the patent to 
fix the price to the public of the unpatented supplies as effectively as he may fix the 
price on the patented machine”). 
22 224 U.S. 1 (1912). The agreement at issue in A.B. Dick conditioned the sale 
of a patented duplication machine on the promise to purchase all paper and ink from 
the duplication machine manufacturer only. Id. 
23 Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 518. 
24 Id. at 517 (explaining that the Court is “confirmed” in its conclusion to 
overrule A.B. Dick by the Clayton Act § 3, which Congress drafted “as if in 
response” to the Court’s holding in A.B. Dick). 
25 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 n.15 (1984) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, at 12-13 (1914)). 
26 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11 n.15. 
27 Id. 
5
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demonstrates the viewpoint that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any 
purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”28 Such a negative 
outlook on all arrangements to sell two products together, however, is 
rejected today.29 
The Supreme Court first explicitly applied the per se rule to tying 
arrangements in International Salt Co. v. United States.30 In this case, 
International Salt (then, the largest producer of salt for commercial 
purposes) owned patents on two machines for the “utilization of salt 
products.”31 International Salt leased the machines to over 800 
separate lessees on the condition that the lessees purchase all salt for 
use in the machines from International Salt.32 The Court found that the 
tying arrangement was unreasonable per se because it foreclosed 
competitors from a market.33 In its analysis, however, the Court 
appeared to treat two aspects as threshold determinations, necessary 
before finding the tying arrangement unreasonable per se.34 The Court 
first determined that International Salt had market power in the tying 
market.35 Then, the Court justified its decision to condemn the 
arrangement per se by explaining that the volume of business it 
                                                 
28 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) 
29 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11 (explaining that “not every refusal to sell 
two products separately can be said to restrain competition”). 
30 332 U.S. 392 (1947) 
31 Id. at 394 (The first machine, the Lixator, turned rock salt into a brine useful 
in industrial products; the second, the Saltomat, injected salt into canned products).  
32 Id. at 395 n.5. 
33 Id. at 396, 398 (explaining that competitors are able to produce salt of the 
same quality as International Salt, and are shut out of the market by a provision that 
“limits [the market], not in terms of quality, but in terms of a particular vendor”). 
34 Id. at 395-96. 
35 Id. (finding market power in the tying market from International Salt’s 
patented machines, the Court stated, “[f]rom [the patents] appellant derives a right to 
restrain others from making, vending or using the patented machines”).  
The market power requirement is explained further in N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States: “where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so that it 
does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the tied item 
any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be 
insignificant at most.” 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).  
6
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affected was not insubstantial.36 These two conditions spurred the 
Supreme Court’s progressive refining of the per se tying definition, 
discussed ahead. 
Six years later, the Court addressed a tying arrangement again in 
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.37 This case dealt with 
the New Orleans newspaper industry, wherein there was one morning 
and two evening newspapers.38 The Times-Picayune Publishing 
Company owned the sole morning newspaper, and one of the two 
evening newspapers.39 According to Times-Picayune’s contract for 
sale of advertising space, potential advertisers had to purchase an 
advertisement in both the morning and the evening newspapers (the 
tying and tied product, respectively).40  
The Times-Picayune Court allowed the arrangement requiring 
purchasers of classified advertising space to purchase space in both the 
morning and evening papers.41 The Court assessed the market for 
classified advertising in New Orleans newspapers,42 and found that the 
Times-Picayune morning newspaper held a forty percent share of the 
relevant market for classified advertising.43 The Court held that this 
share did not comprise the type of market power required under 
International Salt.44 Most notably from a historical standpoint, 
however, the Court also explained that the agreement could not be 
condemned because it did not involve two separate products.45 The 
                                                 
36 Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. 396. 
37 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
38 Id. at 598-602. 
39 Id. at 598. 
40 Id. at 599-600. 
41 Id. at 596-97. 
42 Id. at 612 (surveying the sales of all advertising in New Orleans newspapers 
and deciding that the Times-Picayune was not dominant in the newspaper 
advertising market in the city). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 612-13. 
45 Id. at 614 (explaining that “[t]he common core of the adjudicated unlawful 
tying arrangements is the forced purchase of a second distinct commodity with the 
7
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Times-Picayune Court’s analysis added this separate-product 
requirement to the two threshold requirements for per se treatment of 
tying arrangements promulgated in International Salt. 
While the Times-Picayune Court recognized the International Salt 
threshold requirements for per se treatment of tying arrangements, its 
opinion deviated somewhat from the International Salt analysis.46 The 
Supreme Court clearly restated its conception of the per se rule against 
tying arrangements in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States 
(“NPRC”).47 In 1864 and 1870 the United States government granted 
the defendant approximately forty million acres of land across the 
continent on which to build a railroad.48 The land was granted in belts 
that ranged from twenty to forty miles wide.49 The railroad sold some 
of the land and maintained and leased out the rest of the land.50 The 
sales contracts and lease agreements included a clause requiring the 
owners or lessees to use the defendant’s railroad lines for shipping all 
commodities made on the land.51 The United States brought suit 
claiming these contracts constituted illegal tying arrangements.52 
The NPRC Court addressed this tying arrangement, whereby the 
defendant railroad company sold parcels of land it owned (the tying 
good) on the condition that the owners of that land use the railroad 
company for all their shipping needs (the tied service).53 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                   
desired purchase of a dominant ‘tying’ product, resulting in economic harm to 
competition in the ‘tied’ market”). 
46 The Court deviated from the International Salt holding in that it (1) required 
actual proof of market power in the tying product market, and (2) used slightly 
different analyses for tying under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the 
Clayton Act. Id. at 608-09, 610-13.  
47 356 U.S. 1 (1958).  
48 Id. at 2. 
49 Id. at 3. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 3-4. 
53 Id. Also note that the Court addressed this arrangement under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, and not the Clayton Act because the Clayton Act applies only to 
commodities and land is not a commodity. Id. at 14 n.1. 
8
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Court emphasized that tying arrangements are “unreasonable in and of 
themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with 
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in 
the market for the tied product and a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of 
interstate commerce is affected.”54 In holding the arrangement 
unreasonable per se, the Court inferred market power in the tying 
product (land for sale) because the railroad company was given large 
tracts of land by the government.55 Additionally, the Court inferred a 
“not insubstantial” effect on commerce by the nature of the 
agreement.56  
Despite the emphatic argument in the dissent, the NPRC majority 
implied that tying is treated the same under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, and section 3 of the Clayton Act, and that proof of market power 
in the tying market is unnecessary.57 Additionally, the NPRC Court 
referred to the defendant’s use of market power to induce large 
numbers of customers to give it preference over its competitors as 
“leverage.”58 The leverage concept continues to be important in tying 
arrangement analysis today.59 NPRC showcases the strict per se 
                                                 
54 Id. at 6 (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)). 
55 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 7. 
56 Id. at 12 (stating that no matter what possible redeeming qualities the tying 
agreements may have, the “essential fact remains that these agreements are binding 
obligations held over the heads of vendees which deny defendant's competitors 
access to the fenced-off market on the same terms as the defendant”). 
57 See id. at 13-14 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (arguing that tying agreements 
assessed under Sherman Act § 1 “raise legal issues different from those presented by 
the legislatively defined tying clauses invalidated under the more pointed 
prohibitions of the Clayton Act,” and that “both proof of dominance in the market 
for the tying product and a showing that an appreciable volume of business in the 
tied product is restrained are essential conditions to judicial condemnation of a tying 
clause as a per se violation of the Sherman Act”) (emphasis in original). 
58 Id., 356 U.S. at 7 
59 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1700d (stating that “[t]he 
original, continuing, and most fundamental concern about tying is ‘leverage’”); 5 
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1134a (1981) (defining 
leverage as “a supplier’s power to induce his customer for one product to buy a 
9
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treatment of tying arrangements in the Court’s early cases.60 The 
Court’s approach to tying arrangements began to change through the 
1960’s and 1970’s.61 
  
B. Changing Per Se Illegality 
 
The Supreme Court’s change from its rigid analysis of tying 
arrangements to a more cautious approach, requiring more proof of 
market power and anticompetitive effects, is exemplified through its 
decisions in Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.62 
(“Fortner I”) and United States Steel Corp v. Fortner Enterprises 
Inc.63 (“Fortner II”). The plaintiff in Fortner I filed a tying 
arrangement suit against defendants, U.S. Steel and U.S. Steel Homes 
Credit Corp., its wholly-owned subsidiary credit corporation (the 
“Credit Corporation”).64 The alleged tying arrangement in Fortner I65 
required corporations and individuals to purchase prefabricated steel 
homes from U.S. Steel (the tied product) as a condition to obtaining 
financing from the Credit Corporation (the tying service).66 The 
plaintiff explained that he agreed to purchase the prefabricated steel 
homes so he could obtain financing for 100 percent of his land from 
the Credit Corporation; no other company would provide him that 
service.67 Fortner I was granted certiorari after the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the defendants in a 
                                                                                                                   
second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit 
of that second product”). 
60 For another example of a strict per se analysis, see Fortner Enters. Inc. v. 
U.S. Steel Corp. (“Fortner I”), 394 U.S. 495 (1969). 
61 This change has been credited to the Chicago-School’s influence on antitrust 
law during that period. See Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and 
Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001). 
62 394 U.S. 495 (1969). 
63 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
64 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 496-97. 
65 And in Fortner II. 
66 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 497. 
67 Id. at 504. 
10
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summary judgment proceeding on the grounds that the plaintiff failed 
to establish sufficient market power in the tying service.68  
The Supreme Court first rejected the district court’s finding that 
the plaintiff could not proceed on the merits of the case where it failed 
to prove market power in the tying service.69 The Court then turned to 
whether the plaintiff pled facts which, if proved at trial, could render 
the defendants’ tying arrangement illegal per se.70 In finding that the 
plaintiff pled sufficient facts showing economic power in the tying 
service, the Court emphasized that the Credit Corporation’s terms were 
“uniquely and unusually advantageous.”71 From this, the Court 
inferred that the Credit Corporation had “unique economic 
advantages” over its competitors.72 In other words, the Court held that 
sufficient market power in the tying market could be shown because 
the rate offered by the credit company was unique.73 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court found that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of 
action and allowed the case to proceed.74 The Fortner I decision came 
                                                 
68 Fortner Enters. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762, 768 (W.D. Ky. 1966), 
aff’d 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968), rev’d 394 U.S. 495 (1969). 
69 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 500 (explaining that a finding that the plaintiff failed 
to meet the standards of Int’l Salt and NPRC cannot be fatal for the plaintiff’s 
antitrust case, and that “[a] plaintiff can still prevail on the merits whenever he can 
prove, on the basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of 
the practices involved, that the general standards of the Sherman Act have been 
violated”). Here, the Court meant that even if the agreement is not per se illegal as a 
tying arrangement, it may be illegal under the rule of reason, which is explained 
infra note 104. 
70 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 500-01. 
71 Id. at 504-505 (the Court was referring specifically to the Credit 
Corporation’s ability to provide financing for 100 percent of the purchase price of a 
plot of land). 
72 Id.  
73 However, the Court added in a footnote that “[u]niqueness confers economic 
power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the 
distinctive product themselves." Id. at 506 n.2. This footnote became important in 
Fortner II. 
74 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 510. 
11
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with four dissenting Justices, foreshadowing the different outcome in 
Fortner II.75 
 Eight years after the Court decided Fortner I, the same case came 
knocking at its door; this time, the issue was whether the credit 
company actually had sufficient economic power in the tying market.76 
Unlike in Fortner I, the Court in Fortner II was not hasty to infer 
market power in the tying market from the uniqueness of the tying 
producer’s product.77 While the Court asserted that its decision in 
Fortner II was consistent with Fortner I, it held that the plaintiff failed 
to establish market power in the tying service.78 In Fortner II, the 
Court refused to infer that the Credit Corporation held sufficient 
market power in the credit industry because of U.S. Steel’s size, and 
likewise refused to infer market power from the fact that a large 
number of purchasers accepted the tied package.79 The Court also 
rejected the inference of market power from the noncompetitive price 
charged for the tied product (building materials for houses).80  
                                                 
75 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. Inc., (“Fortner II”), 429 U.S. 
610 (1977). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 622; see also James P. Melican, Jr., Antitrust Developments: Tying 
Arrangements and Related Restrictions after Fortner II, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 
n.13 (1982) (stating that “[a]lthough Justice Stevens went to great pains to stress that 
there was nothing inconsistent between the Supreme Court's opinions in Fortner I 
and II, many commentators and more than a few judges seem to have concluded that 
the signals did in fact change). 
78 Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 615 (the plaintiff asserted that market power was 
present from four factors: “(1) petitioner Credit Corp. and the Home Division were 
owned by one of the Nation's largest corporations; (2) petitioners entered into tying 
arrangements with a significant number of customers in addition to Fortner; (3) the 
Home Division charged respondent a noncompetitive price for its prefabricated 
homes; and (4) the financing provided to Fortner was ‘unique,’ primarily because it 
covered one hundred percent of Fortner's acquisition and development costs”). 
79 Id. at 617-19 n.10. 
80 Id. at 618. 
12
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Perhaps most surprising,81 considering the direction in which the 
Court seemed to be going with respect to inferring market power in 
Fortner I, was its refusal to infer market power from the uniqueness of 
the Credit Corporation’s service.82 The Court decided that in the 
absence of proof that the Credit Corporation had a cost advantage in 
the tying market, the credit company could not have “the kind of 
uniqueness considered relevant” in tying arrangement analysis.83 In its 
Fortner II opinion, the Court emphasized footnote 2 of Fortner I, 
which required the tying product to have a competitive advantage in 
the tying market in order to infer market power from uniqueness.84 
The Court in Fortner II used this competitive advantage requirement 
to justify its holding that the credit company’s service did not have the 
type of uniqueness that requires an inference of market power.85 These 
requirements highlighted in Fortner II seemed similar to the analysis 
in Times-Picayune that started to stray from the International Salt 
strict per se analysis; however, the Court still referred to its analysis as 
a per se inquiry.86 
  
C. The Per Se Analysis under the Supreme Court Today 
 
While the changing views of the per se rule for tying 
arrangements explained above may make the rule seem somewhat 
unstable, one maxim has emerged from the previously examined cases 
                                                 
81 Melican, supra note 77, at n.16 (remarking, “[t]he Supreme Court's 
conclusion in Fortner II that Fortner had simply failed to sustain the burden of proof 
of sufficient economic power the Court had outlined in Fortner I must have come as 
a surprise to more than a few of the lawyers and judges involved in the long history 
of that case”). 
82 Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620-21. 
83 Id. 
84 See note 73 supra. 
85 Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 621-22 (holding that “if the evidence merely shows 
that credit terms are unique because the seller is willing to accept a lesser profit -- or 
to incur greater risks -- than its competitors, that kind of uniqueness will not give rise 
to any inference of economic power in the credit market”). 
86 Id. at 612. 
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and has remained at the forefront of the tying analysis: “the essential 
characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s 
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into 
the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, 
or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”87 
This concept reflects the decisions and emphasized policies contained 
in many of the previously addressed cases.  
The Supreme Court majority in Jefferson Parish clung strongly to 
the per se rule for contractual tying arrangements in a hotly-contested 
opinion that has since endured.88 The five-to-four decision in Jefferson 
Parish saw all nine Justices agree in upholding the arrangement at 
issue, but disagree on the appropriate road to that conclusion.89 
Despite the arguments against the application of the per se rule 
contained in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, Justice Stevens’ 
majority opinion proclaimed, “[i]t is far too late in the history of our 
antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying 
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and 
therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”90 
The tying arrangement in Jefferson Parish consisted of a contract 
between a hospital (the “Hospital”) and a firm of anesthesiologists (the 
“Firm”) establishing the Firm as the sole provider of anesthesia in the 
Hospital.91 The plaintiff asserted that this agreement constituted a per 
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as a tying arrangement 
because patients at the Hospital must use an anesthesiologist from the 
Firm.92  
Justice Stevens began his majority opinion by explaining the 
importance of “forcing” (derived from the concept of leverage) in the 
                                                 
87 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1286 (2006) 
(citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984)). 
88 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2. 
89 See id. 
90 Id. at 10. 
91 Id. at 4. The tying service in this agreement was hospital care; the tied 
service was “anesthesiological services.” Id. at 2. 
92 Id. 
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per se tying arrangement analysis.93 He then delved into the 
appropriate threshold requirements a court must address before finding 
a tying arrangement is unreasonable per se.94 The majority recognized 
that a prerequisite for condemning tying arrangements under the per se 
rule is the existence of “some special ability [held by the seller]—
usually called ‘market power’—to force a purchaser to do something 
that he would not do in a competitive market.”95 A second threshold 
requirement recognized by the Jefferson Parish majority as necessary 
for per se condemnation of a tying arrangement is the foreclosure of “a 
substantial volume of commerce” by the arrangement.96 The majority 
concluded its explanation of the per se rule’s threshold requirements 
by asserting that a tying arrangement requires the sale of two separate 
products or services.97 This statement of the requirements for per se 
                                                 
93 Id. at 12 (explaining that “forcing” exists where the seller can exploit “its 
control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product 
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase 
elsewhere on different terms,” and that when “‘forcing’ is present, competition on 
the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is 
violated”). 
94 Id. at 12-19. 
95 Id. at 13-17 (explaining in dicta that market power in the tying product, 
which makes forcing likely, exists where (1) the seller has a patent or similar 
monopoly, (2) the seller’s share of the market is high, or (3) the seller is able to offer 
a unique product that competitors are unable to offer). 
96 Id. at 16 (stating, “when a purchaser is ‘forced’ to buy a product he would 
not have otherwise bought even from another seller in the tied-product market, there 
can be no adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which 
would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed”); but see 
id. at 12 (explaining that an invalid tying arrangement exists where the buyer was 
forced “into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, 
or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms”) (emphasis 
added). 
97 Id. at 18 (holding, “we must consider whether petitioners are selling two 
separate products that may be tied together, and, if so, whether [the defendants] have 
used their market power to force their patients to accept the tying arrangement”). 
15
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illegality of tying arrangements continues to constitute the test favored 
by the Supreme Court when addressing tying arrangements.98 
After analyzing the services offered by the Hospital and the Firm, 
the majority concluded that “anesthesiological services and the other 
hospital services” are separate products, and are treated so by 
patients.99 The Court then moved on to the market power requirement 
and found the Hospital lacked sufficient market power to force the tie 
on consumers.100 The majority upheld the tying arrangement because 
the plaintiff’s only evidence of market power was a “preference” for 
services from the Hospital.101 The Court stated that such a preference 
is not probative of significant market power especially where seventy 
percent of the Jefferson Parish (where the Hospital is located) 
residents enter other hospitals.102  
Justice O’Connor authored the concurrence in Jefferson Parish 
(joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist) 
calling for the abandonment of the per se standard for tying 
arrangements.103 The concurrence asserted that the only proper way to 
assess the validity of tying arrangements is through a rule of reason 
analysis.104 The approach to analyzing tying arrangements proposed 
by Justice O’Connor includes three requirements that the agreement 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1286, 1291 
(2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
99 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-20. 
100 Id. at 26 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 26-27 (stating that “[t]he fact that a substantial majority of the 
parish’s residents elect not to enter East Jefferson means that the geographic data do 
not establish the kind of dominant market position that obviates the need for further 
inquiry into actual competitive conditions”). 
103 Id. at 35 (arguing that “[t]he time has . . . come to abandon the ‘per se’ label 
and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic 
benefits, that the tie may have”). 
104 A rule of reason analysis (the alternative to a per se analysis in antitrust) 
focuses on whether a contract actually unreasonably restrains competition. This uses 
an inquiry into the actual economic benefits and detriments the particular agreement 
causes in the market, and analyzes each individual agreement separately. Id. at 30, 
41 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
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must meet in order to warrant further inquiry of the arrangement;105 
Justice O’Connor insists however, that a tying arrangement meeting all 
three requirements should still be upheld if it creates sufficient 
economic benefits.106  
The arguments contained in the Jefferson Parish concurrence 
have been well-received by some scholars, and even judges.107 
However, the per se analysis explained by the majority remains the 
analysis used today in assessing contractual tying arrangements.108 
A recent Supreme Court decision upheld the Jefferson Parish 
majority’s per se analysis of tying arrangements while also citing 
favorably Justice O’Connor’s arguments in the concurrence.109 Illinois 
Tool Works presented a tying arrangement whereby the defendant sold 
its patented printheads (the tying product) to printer manufacturers on 
the condition that the printer manufacturers agree to purchase ink (the 
tied product) for the printheads exclusively from the defendant.110 The 
Court focused its analysis of the agreement on whether the record 
supported the appellate court’s finding that the defendant’s patent on 
                                                 
105 Id. at 41 (O’Connor’s requirements for a rule of reason inquiry are: (1) 
market power in the tying product, (2) a substantial threat of market power in the 
tied product, and (3) a coherent economic basis for treating the products as distinct). 
106 Id.  
107 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1288 (2006) 
(agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s argument that “the presumption that a patent 
always gives the patentee significant market power” is improper in assessing market 
power in the tying product); Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. 
Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210 (7th Cir. 1985); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, 
Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986); Hylton supra note 61, at 479 (contending 
that Justice O’Connor’s rule of reason analysis “would have brought contractual 
tying doctrine in line with the technological integration case law developed in lower 
courts”); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1737c (2d ed. 2004). 
108 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (favoring the Jefferson Parish majority’s 
standards for addressing tying arrangements). 
109 See Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. 1281. 
110 Id. at 1284. 
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the tying product inferred market power in the tying product’s 
market.111  
In reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Court held that a 
patent on a tying product does not infer market power in the tying 
product’s market.112 This holding ran counter to the dictum in 
Jefferson Parish regarding a patent’s effect on market power.113 The 
Court explained its decision that a patent no longer infers market 
power: “after our decision in Jefferson Parish repeated the patent-
equals-market-power presumption [citation omitted], Congress 
amended the Patent Code to eliminate that presumption in the patent 
misuse context.”114 Because the basis for inferring market power from 
patents was revoked,115 the Court determined “it would be anomalous 
to preserve the presumption” of market power from the existence of a 
patent.116 This result is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s argument in 
her Jefferson Parish concurrence that the existence of a patent alone is 
insufficient to demonstrate that a seller possesses sufficient market 
power.117  
While the Illinois Tool Works Court dismissed the inference of 
market power from a patent explained in the Jefferson Parish decision, 
it also explicitly recognized that the general per se test explicated in 
Jefferson Parish is the proper analysis for tying arrangements.118 The 
Court now seems to require the same proof of market power necessary 
to engage in forcing119 in cases involving intellectual property holders 
as it does in cases not involving intellectual property holders (such as 
                                                 
111 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  
112 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291. 
113 See supra note 95.  
114 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1290. 
115 See supra discussion on the history of tying arrangements in Section I(A). 
116 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1290. 
117 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7 (1984)  
118 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (holding that “tying arrangements 
involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards applied in cases 
like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish”). 
119 See supra note 93. 
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Jefferson Parish).120 In the short period of time since the Court’s 
analysis in Illinois Tool Works, its holding has already caused some 
confusion in the lower courts with respect to the application of the 
Jefferson Parish per se tying analysis.121 
  
D. The Seventh Circuit and the “Economic Interest” Requirement 
 
Some circuits have required the plaintiff to show an additional 
element before the court will find a tying arrangement is unlawful per 
se. This element, the “economic interest” requirement, first surfaced in 
the Fourth Circuit in 1958.122 Although the requirement’s direct 
applicability to the per se tying test was uncertain,123 other circuits 
began to employ the economic interest requirement in their per se 
tying arrangement analyses.124  
The Seventh Circuit announced its approval of the economic 
interest requirement in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. 
Sealy.125 This 1978 holding cited a Sixth Circuit case in stating “there 
is no illegal tying arrangement where a ‘tying’ company has absolutely 
no financial interest in the sales” of the tied company.126  
                                                 
120 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (stating, “[w]hile some [tying 
arrangements involving patented products] are still unlawful, such as those that are 
the product of a true monopoly or a marketwide conspiracy [citations omitted], that 
conclusion must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than 
by a mere presumption” of market power from the existence of a patent). 
121 See Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2006). 
122 Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). 
123 See Eric D. Young, The Economic Interest Requirement in the Per Se 
Analysis of Tying Arrangements: A Worthless Inquiry, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 
1364-65 (1990) (explaining that “Miller addressed two separate claims” and that “the 
first part of the opinion [in Miller], which identified an economic interest 
requirement, did not even address tying arrangements”). 
124 See Roberts v. Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d 1476, 1478-81 
(9th Cir. 1983); Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 
1979); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 835 (7th Cir. 
1978); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1964). 
125 Ohio-Sealy Mattress, 585 F.2d 821 at 835. 
126 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Carl Sandburg Village 
Condominium Association No. 1 v. First Condominium Development 
Co.,127 written by Judge Flaum exactly one year after Jefferson 
Parish,128 reaffirmed the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the economic 
interest requirement in its tying arrangement analysis. Unlike the 
Reifert case, the holding of Carl Sandburg Village hinged on the 
application of the economic interest requirement.129 The alleged tying 
arrangement in Carl Sandburg Village involved the sale of 
condominium units (the tying product) conditioned on the signing of 
maintenance and management contracts (the tied service) with a 
particular service provider.130 The condominium developer and the 
provider of management and maintenance services were unaffiliated 
entities.131 The Carl Sandburg Village court upheld the arrangement at 
issue because the plaintiff failed to “establish the necessary economic 
interest element of the tying seller in the tied product market.”132 
The court justified its implementation of the economic interest 
requirement by noting that it is used “by courts in the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,”133 and by reciting 
policy concerns raised in Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish 
                                                 
127 758 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1985). 
128 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Carl Sandburg Vill., however, affirmed a 
district court’s holding from a year prior to the Supreme Court’s Jefferson Parish 
decision. See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co. 586 
F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
129 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 209.  
130 Id. at 205 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 209.  
133 Id. at 208. Since the Carl Sandburg Village decision, the Second Circuit has 
expressly rejected the economic interest requirement in Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s 
House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514 (2d Cir. 1989); the Third Circuit has 
omitted the requirement from its stated per se tying inquiry in Brokerage Concepts, 
Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1998); the Eleventh Circuit has 
continued use of the requirement, but expressed doubt in its applicability to tying 
arrangements in Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1579 n.12 
(11th Cir. 1991); and, the Tenth Circuit has adopted the requirement in Abraham v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 461 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2006). 
20
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concurrence.134 The Seventh Circuit cited the Jefferson Parish 
concurrence in stating that the goal of antitrust laws “in the tying 
context is to prevent the economically harmful effects of tie-ins in 
cases where a seller’s power in the market for the tying product is used 
to create additional power in the market for the tied product.”135 This 
policy consideration led the Carl Sandburg Village court to announce 
that “[o]ne of the threshold criteria that a plaintiff must satisfy under . . 
. the per se . . . analys[is] . . . is that there is a substantial danger that 
the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product 
market.”136 
Two and a half years later, the Seventh Circuit rethought its 
position on the economic interest requirement in Parts and Electric 
Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc. (“P&E”).137 The issue in P&E 
was an arrangement whereby the defendant sold replacement parts for 
electric motors (the tying product) to distributors on the condition that 
the distributors also agree to purchase and “aggressively promote 
minimum quantities” of electric motors (the tied product).138  
The defendant in P&E failed to preserve the issue of whether the 
economic interest requirement is necessary in a per se tying analysis 
on appeal to the Seventh Circuit;139 nevertheless, the court addressed 
                                                 
134 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 210 (stating that, in order to establish per 
se illegality of a tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show that “there is a substantial 
danger that the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product market) 
(citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36-39 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J. concurring)). 
135 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 210 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2, 
36-37 (O’Connor, J. concurring)); but see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13 n.19 
(explaining that “[t]he tying seller may be working toward a monopoly position in 
the tied product, and even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses other sellers of 
the tied product and makes it more difficult for new firms to enter that market”) 
(quoting Fortner Enter. v. United States Steel Corp. 394 U.S. 495, 512-14 (1969) 
(White, J. dissenting)). 
136 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 210. 
137 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987). 
138 Id. at 713-14. 
139 Id. at 714. The defendant did not object to the jury instruction that “market 
power [in the tied product] is not relevant” during trial, nor did it proffer an 
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the issue in dicta.140 The P&E court explained that Carl Sandburg 
Village is controlled by Jefferson Parish.141 After analyzing the policy 
considerations and the holding in Jefferson Parish, the Seventh Circuit 
in P&E expressed a view that the Jefferson Parish majority does not 
“articulate as a prerequisite to a tying violation that there be a 
substantial danger that the tying seller will acquire market power in 
the tied product market.”142  
The P&E court recognized that Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson 
Parish concurrence created a debate “among both judges and 
scholars” on this topic.143 The Seventh Circuit concludes, however, by 
noting “notwithstanding this debate, the requirement that there be a 
threat of market power in the tied product has not been endorsed as a 
requisite for a tying violation by a Supreme Court majority.”144 
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN 
REIFERT V. SOUTH CENTRAL WISCONSIN MLS CORP. 
  
In Reifert v. South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp.,145 the Seventh 
Circuit put its stamp on a factual issue already confronted by several 
other circuits.146 The plaintiff in Reifert was a real estate buyer’s agent 
who alleged that the defendant (a real estate multiple listing service 
                                                                                                                   
instruction that market power in the tied product was important to the claim that the 
tying arrangement was per se illegal. Id. at 717. 
140 Id. at 718. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 718-19 (stating, “[o]n the other hand, Justice O’Connor, in a 
concurring opinion joined by three other Justices, advocates in [Jefferson Parish] 
that per se principles of liability be abandoned and that to establish a tying violation 
‘there must be a substantial threat that the tying seller will acquire market power in 
the tied-product market’”) (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2, 38 (O’Connor, J. concurring)). 
144 Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 719. 
145 450 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2006). 
146 See Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1991); 
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 
1988). 
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(“MLS”))147 engaged in an illegal tying arrangement by conditioning 
access to its services (the tying service) on the purchase of a 
membership in a local Realtors Association (the tied service).148 This 
same arrangement was addressed by the First and Eleventh Circuits 
prior to Reifert. A brief look at theses circuits’ holdings on this issue 
will assist the analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s Reifert opinion. 
The MLS tying arrangement issue arose in Wells Real Estate v. 
Greater Lowell Board of Realtors in 1988.149 The plaintiff in Wells 
appealed to the First Circuit the district court’s directed verdict for the 
defendants on his tying claim.150 The court in Wells upheld the 
arrangement because the plaintiff failed to show that it foreclosed a 
substantial volume of commerce.151 The First Circuit so held because 
the plaintiff did not demonstrate a market for real estate board 
membership affected by the arrangement.152 Conversely, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that an MLS tying 
arrangement was illegal per se in Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-
List, Inc.153 The Thompson court found that the arrangement had a 
“not insubstantial” effect on interstate commerce because the plaintiff 
showed that another real estate membership board lost around 400 
members due to the agreement.154  
                                                 
147 An MLS includes a computerized database of homes and properties for sale 
in a particular market. Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., No. 04-C-969-S, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23431, *3 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 25, 2005). 
148 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 315. 
149 Wells, 850 F.2d at 803. 
150 Id. at 807. 
151 Id. at 815. 
152 Id. (explaining that there is no evidence that other brokers would have 
purchased membership in other real estate boards “but for the power exerted by the 
lure of the defendants’ MLS”). 
153 934 F.2d 1566, 1579 (11th Cir. 1991). 
154 Id. at 1577-78 (the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from an officer of a 
competing real estate board stating that because of the cost of joining both boards, 
400 members or potential members of the affiant’s board have quit or declined to 
join). 
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While the Wells and Thompson cases reached different outcomes 
in assessing the sufficiency of real estate MLS tying claims, their 
reasoning is consistent. Both cases can be read together to conclude 
that a real estate MLS tying claim is insufficient where there is no 
evidence of a real estate association that competes with the association 
favored by the tie to MLS access.155 Therefore, Wells and Thompson 
both properly require foreclosure of a substantial amount of commerce 
in the tied product market (i.e. the market for real estate association 
memberships) in assessing the legality of a real estate MLS tying 
arrangement. 
  
A. Reifert’s Tying Claim 
 
The plaintiff in Reifert (“Mr. Reifert”) was a licensed real estate 
broker located in south central Wisconsin.156 His membership in the 
Realtors Association of South Central Wisconsin (“RASCW”) and his 
use of South Central Wisconsin MLS’s (“SCWMLS”) services began 
in 1988.157 He claimed that he had no desire to maintain his RASCW 
membership, and that he belonged to RASCW only because it enabled 
him to access SCWMLS.158 The plaintiff objected to the fees he was 
forced to pay as a result of his membership in RASCW, and claimed 
that he was forced to pay dues in excess of $2,000.00 for this 
unwanted membership during a four-year period.159 
Mr. Reifert’s ill-fated tying arrangement claim began in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.160 
Judge John C. Shabaz ruled on cross motions for summary judgment 
                                                 
155 ROBERT D. BUTTERS, 10A-8 REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 8.04 (MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC. 2006). 
156 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2006). 
157 Id.  
158 Id 
159 Id. 
160 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., No. 04-C-969-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23431 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 25, 2005). 
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in favor of the defendant, SCWMLS.161 The district judge relied 
heavily on the First Circuit’s Wells162 decision in his analysis of the 
facts in Reifert.163 Consequently, summary judgment was granted for 
the defendant because the plaintiff failed to show that “there are 
competing providers of services in the tied product market whose sales 
have been foreclosed by the tie between [the] MLS and [RASCW].”164 
In differentiating this case from Thompson, Judge Shabaz noted that 
the plaintiff did not offer “evidence of a single real estate professional 
who has joined [another real estate association] instead of [RASCW] 
or who has declined to join [a different real estate association] because 
he or she is a member of [RASCW].”165 The plaintiff appealed this 
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  
  
B. The Seventh Circuit Majority’s Analysis of Reifert 
 
Judge Flaum (along with Judge Kanne) agreed with the district 
court in his opinion on appeal.166 The Reifert majority first announced 
the test it employs for tying arrangements; it explained “this Court 
requires the plaintiff to prove four elements.”167 The court then set 
forth the elements:  
 
In order to establish the per se illegality of a tying 
arrangement, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the tying 
arrangement is between two distinct products or 
services, (2) the defendant has sufficient economic 
power in the tying market to appreciably restrain free 
competition in the market for the tied product, and (3) a 
                                                 
161 Id. at *16. 
162 Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 
815 (1st Cir. 1988). 
163 Reifert, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23431 at *9. 
164 Id. at *16. 
165 Id. at *13. 
166 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 321 (7th Cir. 2006). 
167 Id. at 316 (emphasis added). 
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not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is 
affected [citations omitted]. In addition, this circuit has 
held that an illegal tying arrangement will not be found 
where the alleged tying company has absolutely no 
economic interest in the sales of the tied seller, whose 
products are favored by the tie-in.168 
 
Judge Flaum recognized that the plaintiff easily satisfies the first 
two elements of this test.169 The Seventh Circuit, however, agreed with 
the district court that the plaintiff could not show foreclosure of 
commerce without evidence of competitors in the market for services 
offered by RASCW.170  
Part of the majority’s opinion in Reifert attempts to justify the per 
se tying analysis declared therein.171 This is in direct response to the 
concurrence’s disapproval of including the economic interest factor in 
the per se tying test.172 In note 2 of his majority opinion, Judge Flaum 
defends the use of the economic interest factor by stating that (1) the 
Supreme Court recently approved of Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson 
Parish concurrence,173 and (2) that the Supreme Court has not yet 
disagreed with Carl Sandburg Village.174 Nevertheless, the majority 
                                                 
168 Id. (citing Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1. v. First Condo Dev. 
Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
169 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 (stating that “access to the multi-listing service 
cannot be obtained without purchasing the tied product, a Realtors Association 
membership,” and that “SCWMLS has sufficient market power to restrain free 
competition”). 
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 316-17. 
172 Id. at 317 n.2. 
173 Id. (stating “the Supreme Court recently adopted Justice O’Connor’s 
reasoning in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 and held that tying arrangements 
involving patents should be evaluated based on their market power ‘rather than 
under the per se rule”) (citing Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 
1281, 1291 (2006)). 
174Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 n.2 (stating “[a]lthough the per se analysis of the 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 majority has not been expressly over-ruled, in the 
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does not get a chance to employ the economic interest factor in Reifert 
since it upholds summary judgment for the defendants due to the 
plaintiff’s failure to plead that the arrangement forecloses a substantial 
volume of commerce in the tied service market.175 
  
C. Judge Wood’s Reifert Concurrence  
 
While Judge Wood agreed with the majority’s conclusion in 
Reifert, she did not subscribe to the majority’s use of the Carl 
Sandburg Village test.176 She saw the Carl Sandburg Village test as 
ignoring the Supreme Court’s per se approach in Jefferson Parish.177 
Judge Wood held strong to the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish, 
noting that it explained the per se test for tying, and that the Supreme 
Court has not backtracked from its holding despite a very recent 
opportunity to do so.178 She further explained that according to 
Jefferson Parish, per se treatment is appropriate where forcing179 is 
probable, and forcing is probable if a substantial volume of commerce 
is foreclosed by the arrangement and it is probable that the seller has 
market power in the tying product.180  
In refusing to acquiesce to the majority’s Carl Sandburg Village 
test, Judge Wood approved of the test propounded by the D.C. Circuit 
                                                                                                                   
intervening twenty-one years since Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo Ass’n No. 1, the 
Supreme Court has not found occasion to disagree with this Circuit’s approach”). 
175 Id. at 320 (explaining that because the plaintiff failed to meet the third 
requirement, the court need not “address whether SCWMLS has a sufficient 
economic interest in the sales of the tied product to satisfy the fourth element of an 
unlawful tying arrangement”). 
176 Id. at 323 (Wood, J. concurring). 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 322-23 (explaining the recent Ill. Tool Works decision: “Illinois Tool 
Works . . . stands only for the proposition that a plaintiff must prove that a holder of 
intellectual property has ‘either the degree or the kind of market power that enables 
him to force customers’ to purchase the tied product,” and if a plaintiff can, “then the 
framework established by Jefferson Parish continues to apply). 
179 See note 93, supra. 
180 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 322 (Wood, J. concurring); see Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-19 (1984). 
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in United States v. Microsoft Corp.181 This test sets forth four elements 
to a per se tying violation: (1) the tying and tied goods are two 
separate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying 
product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to 
purchase the tied product from it (i.e. a tie actually exists); and (4) the 
tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce.182 
Noticeably absent from the foregoing is any semblance of the 
economic interest requirement from Carl Sandburg Village. Using this 
test, Judge Wood still agreed with the majority that the plaintiff’s 
claim failed because he did not offer evidence of any foreclosure of 
commerce by the tying arrangement.183 Specifically, Judge Wood 
explained that according to the record “no one refrained from joining 
any other organization because of the cost of membership” in 
RASCW, and therefore the plaintiff’s tying claim fails.184 
In the concurrence’s final paragraph, Judge Wood succinctly 
restates her position on the majority’s tying arrangement analysis.185 
She summarizes:  
 
Analytically, the majority may well be right that the 
rule of reason approach it sees in [Carl Sandburg 
Village] [citation omitted] would be a more sensible 
way to approach all tying cases. But it is not for this 
court to anticipate the Supreme Court’s overruling of its 
earlier decisions, even if the passage of time and the 
impact of later cases that create doctrinal tensions are 
evident to all.186 
 
                                                 
181 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. 
Servs. Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992), and Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-18 
(1984)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 932 (2001). 
182 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 323 (Wood, J. concurring). 
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
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Judge Wood asserts that the Seventh Circuit should have limited 
itself “to pointing out the problems [it] see[s] and then attempting to 
apply the law as it stands”187 as the court did in Khan v. State Oil 
Co.188 According to Judge Wood, the “law as it stands” forbids adding 
Carl Sandburg Village’s economic incentive requirement to the 
Jefferson Parish per se tying framework.189 
 
III. TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE 
REQUIREMENT 
  
The disagreement between the majority and the concurrence in the 
Seventh Circuit’s Reifert decision exemplifies the difficulty the circuit 
courts have endured in applying the per se tying analysis. Differing 
views on Jefferson Parish’s policy and its stated per se analysis have 






                                                 
187 Id.  
188 In Khan v. State Oil Co, the Seventh Circuit applied the per se rule to 
vertical maximum price fixing pursuant to the then-authoritative Supreme Court case 
law despite its “increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations” because “the Supreme 
Court has told the lower federal courts, in increasingly emphatic, even strident, 
terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a decision by the Court.” 93 F.3d 1358, 
1363, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 
(1997).  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously decided to change the 
law because of the well-reasoned attacks against the per se standard for vertical 
maximum price fixing. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 7. Notably the Supreme Court praised 
the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of the case, stating “[t]he Court of Appeals was 
correct in applying [stare decisis] despite disagreement with [previous Supreme 
Court case law], for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its 
precedents.” Id. at 20. 
189 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 323 (Wood, J. concurring). 
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A. The Construction and Justification of the Economic Interest 
Requirement 
  
As stated above, certain circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, 
have used the economic interest requirement in assessing tying 
arrangements under the per se analysis.190 The policy justification for 
this requirement is that “when the seller of the tying goods has no 
interest in the sale of the tied product, he is not using his power in the 
tying product market to invade a second market.”191 Therefore, courts 
using the factor reason that the absence of a tying seller’s economic 
interest in the tied product indicates that the agreement “ha[s] no anti-
competitive impact upon the market for the tied product or service.”192  
The Carl Sandburg Village court attempted to clarify what 
constitutes an economic interest in the tied market.193 The Seventh 
Circuit stated that a tying seller’s economic interest in the sales of the 
tied product does not have to be direct in the sense that the seller of the 
tying product also produces the tied product; the tying seller must 
simply have some form of interest in the sale of the tied product, “such 
as the receipt of a commission or rebate.”194 However, Judge Flaum 
also recognized that “the economic interest requirement is not met 
where a plaintiff merely alleges that the tying seller is receiving 
substantial revenue as a result of his sale of two products as a 
package.”195 The plaintiff in Carl Sandburg Village pled that the tying 
seller realized economic benefit because the tied seller concealed 
                                                 
190 See Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 461 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 
2006); James B. Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1990); Carl 
Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
191 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 208; see also 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 15, ¶ 1709e5 (stating that a tying seller “who lacks an economic interest 
in the tied market can hardly gain incremental revenue or exploit his customers in 
any additional way when it takes nothing from the seller of the second product”). 
192 Beard, 912 F.2d at 141. 
193 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 208. 
194 Id.  
195 Id. 
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defects in condominiums, thereby allowing the tying seller to sell 
more condominiums at a higher price.196 According to the Seventh 
Circuit, this benefit did not comply with the definition of an 
“economic benefit,”197 thus the plaintiff’s complaint was deficient and 
dismissal was proper.198 
The Sixth Circuit has perhaps been the most vehement defender 
of the economic interest requirement. In Beard v. Parkview Hospital, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld a tying arrangement on the grounds that the 
defendant received no direct economic benefit from the provider of the 
tied service.199 The court used this opportunity to contend that 
requiring a plaintiff to show an economic interest in order to condemn 
a tying arrangement as illegal per se is consistent with the Jefferson 
Parish holding.200  
In Beard, the Sixth Circuit states that it is “unpersuaded that the 
‘direct economic benefit’ requirement . . . has been displaced” by 
Jefferson Parish.201 It necessarily recognized that the Jefferson Parish 
majority “did not state that the seller of a tying product or service must 
secure a direct economic benefit from sales of a tied product or 
service” for per se illegality of a tying violation.202 However, the court 
contended that since the Jefferson Parish decision was premised on an 
absence of market power in the tying service, its silence on the 
economic interest requirement should not be construed as disapproval 
                                                 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 209 (stating that “a plaintiff must show that the tying arrangement 
involves a seller who competes in the tying product’s line of commerce as well as 
participates for profit in the tied product market”) (citing Rodrigue v. Chrysler Corp., 
421 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. La. 1976)). 
198 Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 209. 
199 912 F.2d 138, 144 (6th Cir. 1990). The tying arrangement in Beard 
involved an agreement whereby patients receiving care at a hospital (the tying 
service) could only use radiologists from a single radiology firm (the tied service). 
Id. at 139. 
200 Id. at 141-43. 
201 Id. at 142. 
202 Id. 
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of the requirement.203 It also stated that, while Jefferson Parish did not 
list the economic interest requirement as a part of the per se test, the 
requirement is “consistent with the Court’s explanation of what an 
illegal tying arrangement is.”204 The Beard court alleges that the 
Supreme Court’s condemnation of the use of power in the tying 
market to impair competition in the tied market leads to the conclusion 
that arrangements where the tying seller has no economic interest in 
the tied market are harmless because the tying seller “is not attempting 
to invade the alleged tied product or service market.”205 The Sixth 
Circuit concluded by rejecting a contrary construction of Jefferson 
Parish from the Second Circuit206 and upholding the tying 
arrangement because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the economic 
interest requirement.207 
Several erudite antitrust scholars also favor the economic interest 
requirement, and offer compelling economic justifications for its 
implementation.208 Professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp argue that “[a]llowing the allegedly tied customers to 
obtain the tied product from suppliers in which the defendant has no 
financial interest ends most or all of the fears underlying the per se 
rule against tying.”209 These fears are allayed in the absence of a tying 
seller’s economic interest in the tied market for four reasons: (1) the 
defendant cannot gain power in the tied market by requiring customers 
to patronize unrelated firms there; (2) giving the tied firm the ability to 
charge supra-competitive prices in the tied market would normally 
injure the tying firm (because customers would be less inclined to 
                                                 
203 Id. 
204 Id. (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 
(1984) “if [market power in the tying market] is used to impair competition on the 
merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be insulated from 
competitive pressures”). 
205 Beard, 912 F.2d at 142. 
206 Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
207 Beard, 912 F.2d at 143. 
208 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1726d. 
209 Id. at ¶ 1726a. 
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participate in the agreement and purchase the tying product); (3) 
exploitation of power over the tying product (such as price 
discrimination) cannot result from the arrangement if the defendant 
receives no portion of the revenues from the tied product; and (4) once 
the three preceding functions of tying arrangements are put aside, the 
alleged tie-in is likely to be pro-competitive in both motivation and 
effect.210 
 
B. Attacks Against the Economic Interest Requirement’s 
Implementation in the Per Se Tying Analysis 
 
The economic interest requirement has fallen into disfavor among 
some courts and scholars since the Jefferson Parish opinion.211 Even 
the Seventh Circuit, who favored the inquiry in Carl Sandburg Village, 
and in the majority of its recent decision in Reifert, has voiced 
disapproval of the requirement’s use in the per se tying analysis.212 
Opponents of the economic interest requirement’s implementation in 
the per se tying analysis express that the Jefferson Parish majority 
“focused primarily on the anticompetitive effect of tying arrangements 
and the resultant harm to consumer choice in the tied-product 
market,”213 and that the predatory aspects of a tie (the invasion of the 
tied market by the tying seller, as explained in Carl Sandburg 
Village)214 are not the sole reason for their condemnation.215 
Judge Wood explained in her Reifert concurrence that the 
Jefferson Parish majority held that a tying arrangement with two 
different products is illegal per se where “a substantial volume of 
                                                 
210 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1726a (1991). 
211 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 880 F.2d at 1514; Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling 
Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987); Young, supra note 123; Warren S. Grimes, 
Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market 
Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 263 (1994). 
212 Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 712. 
213 Gonzalez, 880 F.2d at 1517. 
214 See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 
F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1985). 
215 Young, supra note 123, at 1365. 
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commerce is foreclosed by the arrangement,” and where the “seller [of 
the tying product] has market power.”216 On these grounds, she 
objected to the Reifert majority’s use of the economic interest factor as 
“anticipat[ing] the Supreme Court’s overruling of its earlier decisions” 
by adding another requirement to the per se tying analysis.217 While 
Judge Wood admits that the test the majority applies may “be a more 
sensible way to approach all tying cases,” she refuses to accede to the 
test and instead opts to “take a more cautious approach, and leave 
further developments in tying law to the high court.”218 
Judge Wood’s concurring opinion in Reifert did not mark the first 
time the Seventh Circuit disapproved of the economic interest 
requirement’s implementation in the per se tying analysis. It expressed 
doubt in the requirement’s relevance to the Jefferson Parish per se 
tying analysis in P&E.219 The court recognized that Jefferson Parish 
controls Carl Sandburg Village (decided two years prior to P&E), and 
examined Justice Stevens’ Jefferson Parish majority opinion in-depth 
to determine whether the holding endorsed the economic interest 
requirement approved by the Seventh Circuit in Carl Sandburg 
Village.220 Conversely, the Carl Sandburg Village opinion cited only 
Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish concurrence in asserting that 
“[o]ne of the threshold criteria that a plaintiff must satisfy under . . . 
the per se . . . analys[is] . . . is that there is a substantial danger that the 
tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product market.”221 
In P&E, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Jefferson Parish 
majority quoted Justice White’s dissent in Fortner I with approval: 
“[t]he tying seller may be working toward a monopoly position in the 
tied product and, even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses other 
                                                 
216 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 322 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Wood, J. concurring). 
217 Id. at 323. 
218 Id. at 321-323. 
219 Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
220 Id. at 718. 
221 Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 
203, 210 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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sellers of the tied product and makes it more difficult for new firms to 
enter that market.”222 It used this language to explain that Justice 
Stevens’ opinion “does not seem to suggest any role for the threat of 
market power in the tied product market as a factor in the [per se 
tying] analysis.”223 While the P&E court conducted the Seventh 
Circuit’s most thorough analysis of the economic interest 
requirement’s place under the Jefferson Parish majority’s opinion, it 
specifically designated its analysis as mere dicta.224 
However, the Second Circuit approved of the Seventh Circuit’s 
dicta in P&E, and expressly adopted it in its holding in Gonzalez.225 
This court agreed with the Seventh Circuit in P&E that the Supreme 
Court has not yet “cut back on the application of tie-in doctrine by 
incorporating [the economic interest] requirement into the test for an 
illegal tying arrangement.”226 For this reason, the Gonzalez court 
explicitly held that “[t]he majority in Jefferson Parish does not require 
any ‘economic interest’ by the tying seller in the tied-product 
market.”227 
                                                 
222 Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 718 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 n.19 (1984) (quoting Fortner Enters. v. United States 
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969) (White, J. dissenting)) (emphasis added in 
P&E). 
223 Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 718. 
224 Id. at 719 (stating “whatever the law may be or ought to become, in this 
case the question is moot since the issue of threatened market power in the tied 
product market was waived by [the defendant]”). 
225 Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 
1517 (2d Cir. 1989). 
226 Id. (citing Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 718 n.5); see also Gordon B. 
Spivack and Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and Traditional 
Tying Law, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, n.34 (1993) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
in Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), by reaffirming the 
Jefferson Parish per se tying inqury, “imposed no requirement that the plaintiff 
prove that market power in the tied product results, or is likely to result from the 
tie”). 
227 Gonzalez, 880 F.2d at 1517. This court concluded by expressing that the 
per se tying analysis has “weaknesses” and that it is “virtually certain” that the 
agreement at issue “would survive scrutiny” under the rule of reason; nevertheless 
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While the foregoing arguments against the economic interest 
requirement mainly address its propriety in the Jefferson Parish per se 
framework, its effectiveness in a per se tying analysis has also been 
questioned by several commentators.228 One commentator contends 
both that the requirement has no place under the Jefferson Parish 
framework and that it is irrelevant to the per se structure.229 Under this 
commentator’s analysis, “all ties restrict the freedom of tied-product 
buyers to purchase products based on the merits of that product, 
resulting in a lessening of competition in the tied product market,” and 
the “economic interest requirement ignores these effects.”230 He 
concludes that the critical question is the degree of foreclosure in the 
tied market, “not the tying seller’s motivation for imposing the tie.”231 
Practical litigation concerns prompted another commentator to 
criticize the economic interest requirement.232 According to this 
commentator, effectively “tracing the financial links” between certain 
types of entities233 may prove virtually impossible for a plaintiff.234 
According to him, such a task “should be wholly unnecessary if the 





                                                                                                                   
the court acknowledged that it “must, of course, adhere to the views of a majority of 
the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1519. 
228 Young, supra note 123; Grimes, supra note 211. 
229 Young, supra note 123 
230 Id. at 1365-66. 
231 Id. at 1368. 
232 Grimes, supra note 211. 
233 Id. at 318. Specifically, the author of this article references separate 
subsidiaries of a parent corporation. See Grimes, supra note 211. 
234 Grimes, supra note 211, at 318. 
235 Id.; see also Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. 
Co., 758 F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging that “it might be difficult for 
a plaintiff to allege the economic interest element in a case of secret rebates or 
discounts where the plaintiff has not had the benefit of discovery”). 
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C. The Economic Interest Requirement Controversy in Reifert 
 
However well-justified the policy considerations favoring the 
economic interest requirement may be, the circuit courts must 
remember that the Jefferson Parish majority’s per se analysis 
continues to dictate the legality of tying arrangements. Resultantly, the 
Seventh Circuit’s stated analysis of the tying arrangement in Reifert 
was incorrect. While the outcome of the case was unaffected by the 
Reifert majority’s error,236 Judge Wood’s more conservative 
concurrence correctly stated the application of existing Supreme Court 
precedent. 
As discussed above, Jefferson Parish explicitly stated that a tying 
arrangement involving two separate products or services is illegal per 
se where the tying seller has market power, and a substantial amount 
of commerce is affected.237 The Court favored the idea that even if a 
tying seller is not working toward a monopoly position in the tied 
market, tying arrangements still have anticompetitive consequences by 
foreclosing other sellers of the tied product from the tied product 
market.238 Leading up to Jefferson Parish, a body of circuit-court case 
law grew favoring the economic interest requirement in the per se 
tying analysis; but the Court in Jefferson Parish, while not explicitly 
addressing the economic interest requirement, “refocused the inquiry” 
on the degree of foreclosure of commerce (as an anticompetitive 
effect) in the tied market, “rather than on the tying seller’s motivation 
to invade a second market.”239 The Seventh Circuit itself observed that 
Jefferson Parish “does not seem to suggest any role” for the 
                                                 
236 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS, 450 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 2006) (the case’s 
dismissal for failure to show foreclosure in the tied product market made it 
unnecessary for the majority to address whether the defendant had “a sufficient 
economic interest in the sales of the tied product to satisfy the [economic interest 
requirement]”). 
237 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984). 
238 Id. at 13 n.19 (quoting Fortner Enter. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 
495, 513 (1969) (White, J. dissenting)). 
239 Young, supra note 123, at 1367. 
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motivation of the tying seller to gain market power in the tied product 
market as a factor in the per se tying analysis.240 
Nevertheless, Judge Flaum, citing the Carl Sandburg Village 
decision that he penned in 1985, reasserted the economic interest 
requirement in Reifert. Judge Wood correctly noted that this aspect of 
the Reifert opinion is in “tension with the governing Supreme Court 
doctrine.”241 As stated in Section II, the Reifert concurrence’s “more 
cautious approach,” which omitted the economic interest requirement 
and mirrored the tying analysis expressed in Jefferson Parish, 
warranted the same result as the majority.242 The majority and 
concurring opinions in the Reifert case differed in that the concurrence 
remained faithful to the Supreme Court’s instruction to the circuit 
courts “not to anticipate an overruling of a decision by the Court.”243  
While the economic interest requirement referenced by the Reifert 
majority may assist in determining the likelihood that the tying seller 
is attempting to parlay market power in the tying market into market 
power in the tied market, this inquiry has no place in the Jefferson 
Parish per se tying analysis. Because the Supreme Court has never 
recognized the economic interest requirement as a prerequisite in the 
per se tying analysis, I would join in Judge Wood’s concurrence 
wherein she applied the Jefferson Parish per se standard to reach her 
holding, but also expressed doubt in the effectiveness of the analysis. 
 
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PER SE TYING ANALYSIS 
  
The turmoil and tumult created by the per se tying analysis is 
obvious through the divided reasoning between Reifert’s majority and 
                                                 
240 Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712, 718 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
241 Reifert 450 F.3d at 321 (Wood, J. concurring). 
242 Id. at 321-23. 
243 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other 
grounds, State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating “[t]he Court of Appeals 
was correct in applying [stare decisis] despite disagreement with [previous Supreme 
Court case law], for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its 
precedents”). 
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concurring opinions. Moreover, the circuits’ argument regarding the 
economic interest requirement’s applicability bespeaks a problem with 
the per se tying analysis itself. Judge Flaum, writing the Reifert 
majority opinion, observed that while the Supreme Court has never 
expressly overruled the per se tying test evinced in Jefferson Parish, it 
recently adopted Justice O’Connor’s reasoning (from her Jefferson 
Parish concurrence) with respect to tying arrangements involving 
patents.244 Justice O’Connor’s call to jettison the per se standard for 
tying arrangements has been endorsed as sound policy by scholars and 
judges.245 Even Judge Wood, in her Reifert concurrence, speculated 
that a rule of reason analysis may “be a more sensible way to approach 
all tying cases.”246 
Antitrust law’s per se analysis is beneficial in that it provides 
clarity and simplicity to courts assessing firms’ commercial 
behavior.247 To effectuate this end, per se illegality eliminates an in-
depth market analysis as to the motivations of anticompetitive 
behavior and a balancing of the positive and negative effects of such 
behavior.248 Therefore, it is reserved for agreements or actions deemed 
so anticompetitive that they warrant a presumption of illegality 
regardless of their actual effects.249 
The per se tying analysis fails in providing clarity and simplicity 
to courts assessing tying arrangements.250 The market power 
requirement creates an inherent difficulty for courts.251 Uncertainty 
                                                 
244 Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 n.2 (citing Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 
126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006)). In Ill. Tool Works, the Supreme Court held that existence of 
a patent on the tying product does not automatically infer sufficient market power in 
the tying market. 126 S.Ct 1281. 
245 See supra note 107. 
246 Reifert 450 F.3d at 323 (Wood, J. concurring). 
247 Phillip Areeda, Excerpts from National Institute on Litigating “Rule of 
Reason” Cases: The Rule of Reason – A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 571 (1986). 
248 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 (1984). 
249 Id. 
250 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b. 
251 Id. 
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about market definition,252 the importance of intellectual property,253 
and the importance of market imperfections254 have clouded the clarity 
of the per se tying analysis. The separate product requirement has also 
created confusion, and has “become highly indeterminate and often 
metaphysical.”255 Resultantly, Justice O’Connor was quite justified in 
contending that “tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule-of-reason 
approach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the 
extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the 
rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements 
that economic analysis would show to be beneficial.”256 
Additionally, a more extensive economic understanding of tying 
arrangements shows that they are capable of many procompetitive 
effects.257 Among these redeeming characteristics are (1) the 
protection of product quality, (2) the lowering of production costs, (3) 
the increase of competition through indirect price cuts, and (4) the 
easing of entry into new markets.258 A tying arrangement can protect a 
product’s quality by ensuring that the necessary supplies or repairs are 
provided or performed exclusively by the defendant.259 Moreover, 
selling or producing two products together can reduce a seller’s costs, 
and this reduction may be passed on to the consumer.260 Producers 
may also combine two products and sell them for less than the sum of 
                                                 
252 Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 
468, 480 (3d Cir. 1992). 
253 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006). 
254 Compare Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 (stating that market 
imperfections “do not generate the kind of market power that justifies condemnation 
of tying”), with Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 
(1992) (finding market power from market imperfections). 
255 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b. 
256 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2 at 34 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
257 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1703g. 
258 Id. 
259 Id.; but see Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (arguing 
that this goal can be accomplished just as easily by informing the consumer of the 
necessary procedures to maintain the quality of the tying product). 
260 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1703g. 
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the price of each individual product; while rival firms may object to 
this tactic, consumers will realize a benefit in a lower purchase 
price.261 Further, a tie can guarantee a seller a certain volume of 
patronage upon entering a new market.262 Again, while competitors in 
the tied market may object to the tie, it would be procompetitive in the 
tied market (as long as it does not foreclose a large portion of the tied 
market) even if the tying seller had a monopoly in the tying market.263 
Today’s understanding of tying arrangements would presumably 
lead to a rule of reason approach in the absence of existing Supreme 
Court precedent.264 However, the expansive body of Supreme Court 
case law examined in Part I requires today’s courts to apply stare 
decisis.265 While the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis in 
American jurisprudence cannot be overstated,266 it is “not an 
inexorable command.”267 The Supreme Court has explained that it will 
detour from the stare decisis path only for articulable reasons, and 
where the Court must bring its opinions into agreement with its 
experience and newly ascertained facts.268  
In his later years, Thomas Jefferson remarked that while “frequent 
and untried changes in laws” are ill-advised, laws “must go hand in 
hand with the progress of the human mind,” and “[a]s [the mind] 




264 See id. at ¶ 1730c (“The reasons [favoring a rule of reason analysis] are so 
forceful that one doubts that the courts, were they writing on a clean slate today, 
would create the peculiar per se rule of today’s tying cases”). 
265 Literally translated from Latin as “to stand by things decided,” this doctrine 
requires courts to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again 
in litigation. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).  
266 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) (stating that the doctrine 
“permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather 
than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our 
constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact”). 
267 Id. at 266. 
268 Id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J. dissenting)). 
41
Mallon: Relaxing the Noose Around Tying Arrangements: <em>Reifert v. Sout
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
512 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are 
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the 
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep 
pace with the times.”269 In light of the current understanding of tying 
arrangements, I believe that we should abolish the per se tying 
standard. It eliminates the necessity of an inquiry into the 
arrangement’s effects (some of which may benefit consumers), and 
fails to create clarity and simplicity in assessing tying arrangements. 
Thusly, the per se standard, as applied to tying arrangements, has 
“most of the disadvantages of the standard rule of reason, without the 
advantages of either” the rule of reason or the per se analysis.270 
Further, I surmise that the per se analysis will one day be renounced 
by the Supreme Court in favor of a rule of reason approach; this 
change will be justified by the continuing difficulties the per se 





While prevailing opinion on the evils of tying arrangements has 
changed since the early days of the Supreme Court’s per se stance,272 
the per se analysis from the Jefferson Parish majority continues to 
dictate the legality of tying arrangements.273 The Court will likely 
                                                 
269 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) (on file 
with the Library of Congress). 
270 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b. 
271 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33-47 
(O’Connor, J. concurring); Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312 (7th 
Cir. 2006); 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b. 
272 Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) 
(stating that “tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of 
competition”), with Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1292 
(2006) (explaining that “[m]any tying arrangements, even those involving patents 
and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market”). 
273 Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (endorsing the Jefferson Parish 
majority’s tying framework). 
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someday recognize that changes in policy considerations and 
economic theory favor moving from the per se standard in assessing 
tying arrangements to a rule of reason inquiry; but until that day 
arrives, the circuit courts must implement the per se analysis evinced 
in Jefferson Parish. Consequently, the Reifert majority’s failure to 
operate within the existing Supreme Court doctrine was correctly 
criticized by Judge Wood in her concurrence.  
The Seventh Circuit’s approval of the economic interest factor 
added another prerequisite to liability under the Supreme Court’s per 
se tying analysis. It is the Supreme Court’s decision alone274 whether 
to relax the per se noose around tying arrangements by adding more 
prerequisites to the analysis, or whether to untie the noose all together 
by abolishing the per se analysis in favor of a rule of reason approach. 
Although the Reifert holding was not affected by the majority’s error, 
its analysis anticipated the overruling of existing Supreme Court 
precedent, and as a result improperly included the economic interest 
factor in its per se tying analysis. 
  
                                                 
274 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). 
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